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Unraveling a puzzle: The case of Value Line timeliness rank upgrades Abstract
We examine a sample of Value Line's timeliness rank upgrades that occur immediately following earnings announcements and find that the pre-event price momentum has significant incremental explanatory power for the post-event drift, after controlling for the level of earnings surprise. Therefore, the drift following Value Line's timeliness upgrades of the stocks that it covers cannot be construed as a mere manifestation of the post-earnings announcement drift. Instead, these findings indicate that Value Line has been exploiting the price momentum effect for decades. Black (1973) had clearly stated that they do but his assertion has never been checked before to resolve the puzzling drift following Value Line rank upgrades.
Unraveling a puzzle: The case of Value Line timeliness rank upgrades
The Value Line Investment Survey is a popular investment advisory service, covering approximately 1,700 of the larger firms listed across various stock exchanges and Nasdaq. Among other stock-related information, Value Line provides 'timeliness ranks' for the stocks it covers, which range from one (best) to five (worst). The timeliness ranks are purportedly a projection of a stock's anticipated performance over the following 12 months. A number of empirical studies have examined Value Line's timeliness ranks and documented an intriguing set of results; higher ranked stocks have a superior performance to those lower down in Value Line's timeliness ranking scale. The persistence in stock-price drift following Value Line's timeliness rank upgrades has also been a puzzle. The phenomenon, entitled the Value Line Enigma, has endured across studies employing different sample periods and methods; and these results are regarded as a challenge to market efficiency.
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In this paper, we examine the stock price drift pursuant to a Value Line timeliness rank upgrade where, by design, the upgrades follow an earnings announcement date. We take our cue from Black (1973) . In his well-cited letter to the Financial Analysts Journal editor, Black (1973) clearly enunciates that Value Line uses price momentum as one of the factors to assign ranks to stocks. However, prior research has not examined the importance of pre-event price momentum in explaining the drift associated with Value Line's stock upgrades. We examine the event-period around the earnings announcement date and the Value Line timeliness rank upgrade date and provide evidence that the preevent price momentum of the upgraded stocks is a significant explanatory variable for the drift in stock prices following an upgrade. .
Despite its fairly recent discovery in academic studies, price momentum is a long enduring empirical regularity. It is the tendency of stock prices to drift with a positive correlation to past abnormal returns over 3-to 12-month holding periods. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) were the first to document the momentum effect.
2 Fama and French (2006) regard the momentum regularity as a 'premier anomaly' which is not consistent with the tenets of market efficiency.
The post-earnings announcement drift is another observable anomaly that has been studied extensively; it is the short-term tendency of stocks to drift in the same direction as a recently announced earnings surprise. 3 In an earlier paper, Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) suggest that Value Line rank revisions are made in response to recent earnings surprises, and that the Value Line Enigma is a mere manifestation of the post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon. Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) report that once the earnings surprise is controlled for, the post-upgrade drift (abnormal returns following their upgrade) across Value Line stocks is no longer significant .
Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall conclude that '…Value Line reacts to, rather than anticipates, earnings announcements. ' (p. 84) The fact that the level of earnings surprise is a significant determinant of the postupgrade drift appears to be supported by Value Line's own statement regarding its by Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) . However, the statement raises some interesting questions. Does Value Line merely piggy-back on the drift following publicly disclosed abnormal earnings reports? And if it does, then why does Value Line publicize and openly disclose a proprietary trade secret? We address these issues in an attempt to unravel the Value Line Enigma.
We find that the post-earnings announcement drift is positively related to the level of earnings surprise for the Value Line upgraded stocks. In addition, we find that post-earnings announcement drift of the Value Line stocks is significantly higher than that of their earnings-surprise-matched control firms. We also find that the price momentum over the six-months preceding the earnings announcement date for the sample Value Line stocks is more than 18% higher than that of the control firms; a difference that is highly significant, economically and statistically. Moreover, the pre-event price momentum is significantly related to the post-earnings announcement drift. Using match-adjusted returns in a cross-sectional regression, we establish that the pre-event price momentum is an important determinant of the higher price drift for the Value Line firms following the earnings-announcement date.
To be consistent with Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992), our focus is also on the drift following the Value Line upgrade date. Examined by itself, the post-upgrade drift is positive and significant for the sample Value Line stocks and the level of earnings surprise is positively, albeit marginally, related to the drift. In addition, we find that for their earnings surprise-matched control firms, the post-upgrade drift is only marginally significant. 4 Although higher, the post-upgrade drift is not statistically different for the Value Line stocks relative to the control firms. We find that the similar magnitude of post-upgrade drift associated with both the upgraded Value Line stocks and their earnings-surprise-matched control firms, is best explained by their pre-event price momentum not their respective levels of earnings surprise.
We check the robustness of our result and get consistent results when we use the calendar-time portfolio approach proposed by Fama (1998) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) . Using the Fama-French three-factor model, we find excess returns for
Value Line stocks following the upgrade date, VLD; but the excess returns disappear once the momentum effect is controlled with the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
These findings do not support the hypothesis that the Value Line Enigma is merely a manifestation of the post-earnings announcement drift. Instead, our findings indicate that Value Line uses the pre-event price momentum as an important factor for its 4 To estimate the post-upgrade drift for the control firms, we define a pseudo upgrade date for them, as they do not have a Value Line upgrade date (VLD). The post-upgrade drift (PUD) of the Value Line upgrades (and their control firms) is measured as the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from day 2 through day 120 relative to the upgrade date (or the pseudo upgrade date) as day 0. The procedure is discussed in Section II entitled Data and Methods.
timeliness rank upgrades and the puzzling drift associated with the Value Line upgrades can be explained by the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, Carhart 1997) . It is important to note that the Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) study predates the documentation of the momentum effect by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) . Thus, for obvious reasons, Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall could not have checked for the momentum effect.
Our results indicate that, to its credit, Value Line recognized the value of momentum trading early on and has been exploiting the momentum effect for decades before its rigorous documentation by academics. We suggest that it is this important element of Value Line's investment strategy that has been less publicized. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section II describes the data and methodology. Section III presents and discusses the results. The conclusions are in Section IV.
I. Literature review and hypotheses:
The Value Line ranking system suggests that the performance of stocks in each rank should be better than that of stocks ranked below. The information is publicly available.
In his well-cited letter to the Financial Analysts Journal editor, Black (1973) Figure 1 illustrates the sample selection process.
The sample thus obtained has 1826 observations. Further attrition to the sample is caused by our requirement of consensus analyst forecast, actual earnings and market value of equity from I/B/E/S, and stock returns from CRSP. At this point, we are left with 1358 Value Line upgrades for which an earnings surprise term, as defined below, is calculated. The earnings surprise, ESURP, is:
where AE is the actual earnings announced on the earnings announcement date EAD as determined from I/B/E/S, MCF is the median consensus forecast for the firm from I/B/E/S and P is the stock price identified from the I/B/E/S ancillaries file corresponding to the specific consensus forecast date. Our next objective is to identify other firms that could be used as control firms for the Value Line upgraded firms. The process for the selection of a control firm is described next.
II.2 Control firm selection:
From the I/B/E/S consensus forecast database, we first identify all firms in the same two digit industrial sector code (as defined by I/B/E/S) as the Value Line upgraded firms. We then require their earnings announcement date (EAD) within a period of ± 15 calendar days of the Value Line upgraded firm's EAD. This is done to ensure that any firm that we pick as a control firm for the Value Line upgraded firm would have its earnings announced in close proximity to that of the sample firm. Additionally, we impose the restriction that these firms must have actual earnings, consensus forecasts, stock price and shares outstanding information available in the I/B/E/S ancillary files.
We next compute the earnings surprise variable, ESURP, and the market value of equity, MVE, for each of these control firms, and rank the control firms based on how close their ESURP and MVE match those of the Value Line upgraded firms. We then retain Value Line upgraded firms and the best matched control firm. This step results in a net sample of 1,358 Value Line upgraded firms and 1358 control firms matched by industry, earnings surprise, and market value of equity.
II.3 Return Estimation:
For empirically examining stock return performance, we use: (i) size-adjusted returns (ii) match adjusted returns and (iii) the calendar time portfolio returns method to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
To estimate the pre-event price momentum, we use size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the window (-126, -2) relative to the earnings announcement date (EAD). 7 We also estimate momentum on a match-adjusted basis as the sample firm's buy-and-hold returns minus that of the control firm. And we require both sample firm and the control firm to have returns in the event window (-126,-2) relative to their earnings announcement date.
To be consistent with Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992), we use sizeadjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to measure the abnormal stock performance over event days (2, 120). 8 As described above, we also choose the control firm to measure the match-adjusted BHARs; the control firm, matched on earnings surprise, thus serves as the benchmark for each sample firm. The post-earnings announcement drift, PEAD, is measured over the (2, 120) day period relative to the earnings announcement date, EAD, as day 0. The match-adjusted abnormal return of the sample firm is equal to its buy-and-hold return minus its analog for the matching firm.
To estimate the post-upgrade drift of control firms, we define a pseudo-upgrade The Value Line upgrades are announced on a weekly basis and our sample does not exhibit event time clustering. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our results we use the methods proposed by Fama (1998) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) and compute calendar-time portfolio returns. Specifically, for each calendar month, we obtain the portfolio return for the upgraded stocks for six months following the event-date month. 9 The portfolio is re-formed every month. We thus create a time series of portfolio monthly returns to run the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) regressions:
where r p is the portfolio return from the sample firms, r f is the risk-free rate, r m is the market portfolio return, SMB is the small-firm portfolio return minus the big-firm portfolio return, HML is the high book-to-market portfolio return minus the low book-tomarket portfolio return for the three factor model in equation (1). For the four-factor model in equation (2), to the three-factors discussed above, we add PRIOR, which is the winner portfolio return minus the loser portfolio return based on the past 12-month period. The three factor model controls for the market, size, and book-to-market effects and adding PRIOR as the fourth-factor additionally controls for the momentum effect.
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The abnormal returns can be tested based on the t-value of the regression intercept (alpha). If alpha is significant using the three-factor model but becomes insignificant when the four-factor model is employed, then we can conclude that the 'abnormal profits' from the three-factor model, if any, are due to the momentum effect.
For each month over the sample period, a calendar-time portfolio is formed by including sample firms starting from the month following the event-date month for six months i.e., event months (+1, +6). The calendar-time portfolios are formed using both equal-and value-weighted schemes for robustness. And the same procedure is employed for the best-matched control firms.
II.4 Sample and control firm characteristics:
The chronological distribution of rank change events is provided in Table 1 . The distribution suggests that no single year dominates by a significant margin, although 1984 seems to have fewer occurrences. However, this could be because of the poor coverage by I/B/E/S/ in the earlier years.
We next provide details on the industrial composition of the sample in Table 2 .
As mentioned before, we use the industrial sector classification as defined by I/B/E/S. This classification scheme should be a priori better than matching on SIC codes; analysts covered on I/B/E/S are expected to be particular in precisely defining the specific industry sector to which the firm belongs. The two sectors which have a higher representation in the sample are the Consumer Services, and Technology sectors.
More detailed characteristics of the sample are provided in Table 3 . The first row shows that the mean earnings surprise term for Value Line upgraded firms is about 0.26% of the stock price, with a median value of 0.13%.
11 There is also a significant range of these earnings surprises from -4.6% to +10.3% of stock price. While an upgrade that accompanies a positive earnings surprise is to be expected, it is somewhat puzzling that
Value Line would upgrade firms with negative earnings surprises.
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The second row of Table 3 provides information on the earnings surprise term for control firms. The mean, median, minimum and maximum value for these control firms are very similar to those of the Value Line upgraded firms. Any post-earnings announcement drift attributable to earnings surprise should be similar for Value Line upgraded firms and their closely matched controls. The third and fourth rows of Table 3 provide information on the secondary matching criterion, namely the market value of equity. 13 It is clear from rows 3 and 4 that the market value of equity of Value Line upgraded firms is greater than that of the control firms.
14 In row 5, we report the number of days from the earnings announcement date to the Value Line upgrade date. By definition, this variable cannot be less than 2 trading days or greater than 45 trading days. The mean (median) is about 16 (10) days, which indicates a skewness towards the lower end of the range. Thus, it would seem that, for this sample specifically, Value Line upgrades the timeliness rank of the stock soon after 11 The stock price referred to here is the stock price from the I/B/E/S/ ancillaries file that pertains to the date on which the consensus forecast was established. This forecast is the most recently available I/B/E/S consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement date. 12 If Value Line upgrades are predicated on positive earnings surprises alone, the distribution of earnings surprises should not contain any negative values. The very fact that there are upgrades occurring after negative earnings surprises suggests that there may be other factors at work besides the earnings surprise that drive Value Line upgrades. 13 The market value of equity referred to here is based on the stock price and number of shares outstanding from the I/B/E/S ancillaries file and pertain to their values as of the consensus forecast date immediately preceding the earnings announcement. 14 Both a matched pair t-test and a Wilcoxon signed rank test confirm that the market value of equity is higher for the Value Line upgraded firms.
the earnings announcement. This evidence indicates that our sample of rank changes is similar to Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) . 15 Lastly, in row 6 of 
III. Results
III.1 Event-study results:
We next present the results of the price reactions for the different event-periods and event-dates for the sample Value Line firms and the control firms. As described earlier, since the control firms do not have a Value Line upgrade date, we define a pseudo upgrade date for the control firms.
The results are summarized in Figure 2 . The bottom row of Figure 2 gives the differences in returns between the treatment firms and the earnings-surprise matched control firms over the different event-periods and dates. The pre-event price momentum of the Value Line stocks is 18.26% higher than the price run-up for the control firms; their difference is large and highly significant (t = 13.47). It is quite evident that the upgraded Value Line stocks have a much higher pre-event price run-up than their earnings-matched control firms.
It is also the case with the price reaction over the event window (EAD-1, EAD+1) which captures the earnings announcement period returns. The difference in the announcement period returns for the same magnitude of earnings surprise is 2.04% and the difference is highly significant (t = 8.43). This is a surprising result because the earnings surprise is (a) contemporaneous, (b) of the same magnitude, and (c) for firms in the same I/B/E/S industrial sector classification.
Next, the return during the intervening period between the earnings announcement and the Value Line upgrade date, i.e., the event period (EAD+2, VLD-2), is also significantly higher for the Value line firms. The difference is 1.44% (t = 5.73).
The upgrade announcement period (VLD-1, VLD+1) returns are significantly higher for the Value Line firms. The difference is 1.69% (t = 9.54). However, this difference is not surprising because the Value Line stocks are upgraded but the control firms only have a pseudo-upgrade date and there is no systematic firm-specific positive news announcement for the control firm sample on that date. 
III.2: Analyses of the post-earnings announcement returns
We first examine the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) using the earnings announcement date, EAD, as the point of reference. The choice of EAD as the event-date is biased towards finding a stronger relation between the earnings surprise, ESURP, and PEAD. This is based on the presumption that the information in the earnings surprise should produce a market reaction closer to the disclosure of the said information. The effect may diminish as time elapses. The results are given in Tables 4 and 5 . Table 4 follows the procedure in Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992), but focuses on the period following the earnings announcement date EAD. Accordingly, for the regression analyses in Table 4 , the dependent variable is the post-earnings announcement drift, PEAD, measured as the size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns over event days (2, 120) in the post-EAD period. We winsorize the dependent variable PEAD at one percent and 99 percent to mitigate the effect of outliers in the regression analyses.
In the regression results of Panel A of In model 4, when we introduce the pre-event price momentum, MOM, in the analysis, ESURP and the indicator variable, VL, remain significant. Of the three variables, the pre-event price momentum MOM is the most significant, and it is positively associated with the post-earnings announcement drift.
We control for the size of the firm, lnMVE, in model 5 and find that firm size and the Value Line indicator variable remain significant as does the earnings surprise variable, ESURP. The results show that the drift (PEAD) following the earnings announcement date EAD is explained by both pre-event price momentum, MOM, and the earnings surprise ESURP.
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We check the robustness of the results in Table 4 , Panel C, by using the matchadjusted post-earnings announcement drift as the dependent variable. Likewise, all the independent variables are also match-adjusted. Accordingly, we get the match-adjusted earnings surprise (ESURP_MA), pre-event price momentum (MOM_MA) and log of the market value of equity (lnMVE_MA). Table 4 , Panel C, model 1 shows that the coefficient for the match-adjusted earnings surprise ESURP_MA is insignificantly different from zero. It confirms the efficacy of our matching process which is based on the magnitude of the earnings surprise; and we observe that the match-adjusted ESURP has no explanatory power. The results in Table 4 , Panels B and C show that the post-earnings announcement drift PEAD is not driven merely by earnings surprise. Before continuing further, it must be noted that the larger PEAD for the sample Value Line firms, includes the returns during the upgrade period (i.e., from VLD-1 to VLD+1) and in the interim period before the upgrade (i.e., EAD+2, VLD-2). As documented in Figure 2 , these two periods produce returns that are significantly higher for the Value Line sample, and consequently, may explain why the Value Line indicator variable, VL, is significant in the Table 4 results. But these results, especially the match-adjusted results in Panel C, also show that Value Line is not merely piggy-backing on the earnings surprise but are more indicative that Value Line also uses the significant pre-event price run-up, MOM, as a primary trigger to upgrade stocks.
III.2.1: Robustness check of PEAD using calendar time portfolio returns
As a robustness check, we run calendar-time portfolio regressions in the six month period, (EAD month +1, EAD month +6). The results are given in Table 5 . As previously discussed, the regression estimate of the intercept term represents the abnormal return for the portfolio after controlling for the Fama-French and momentum factors. We find that
Value Line firms (see Panel A of Table 5) show superior performance (a significant intercept term) even after controlling for the momentum effect. This is consistent with the results in Table 4 and as before, our explanation is that the higher post-EAD returns shown in the event-study results (summarized in Figure 2 ) for the Value Line firms account for the positive and significant calendar-time portfolio excess returns.
Interestingly, as shown in Panel B of Table 5 , there is no significant intercept for any of the regressions for the best matched control firms, regardless of whether the momentum effect is controlled for or not.
III.3: Analyses of the post-upgrade returns
The post-upgrade returns are analyzed in Tables 6 through 8 . The difference from the earlier Tables 4-5 is that the point of reference has been shifted from the EAD to the upgrade date, VLD. In Table 6 we analyze the Value Line firms by themselves. The postupgrade drift (PUD) results are different from the PEAD results shown in Table 4 . We find that the coefficient for ESURP is positive but it is only marginally significant. Once MOM and log of the market value of equity are introduced in the analyses, ESURP still remains marginally significant; while the intercept term becomes statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the pre-event price run-up MOM is highly significant in all the models. As in Table 4 , these results suggest that the post-upgrade drift is most likely driven by the pre-event price momentum.
This effect becomes more apparent in Table 4 , the pre-event price momentum MOM is highly significant in all the models.
Panel B of Table 7 again confirms that the match-adjusted pre-event price momentum has significant incremental effect in explaining the match-adjusted postupgrade drift. In addition, the results in Panel C of Table 7 , where we only examine the best matched control firms, show that the post-upgrade drift of control firms is not related to their level of earnings surprise. Instead, it is significantly explained by the pre-event price momentum.
The pre-event price momentum MOM is highly significant in all the models, in each of the panels of Table 7 . These results indicate that there is a drift associated with both the upgraded Value Line stocks and their best matched control firms, which is best explained by the pre-event price momentum. The event-study results (summarized in Figure 2 ) are consistent with these findings, where the difference between the Value Line firms and their control firms in the post-upgrade period is positive but insignificant and this analyses has shown that it is the pre-event price momentum of both the sample firms and their best matched control firms which explains that result not their respective levels of earnings surprise.
III.3.1: Calendar time portfolio returns following the upgrade announcement month
As before, we run a robustness check using calendar-time portfolio returns in the six month post-upgrade period (VLD month +1, VLD month +6). The results are given in The results -(i) in Table 6 , the insignificant intercept term once the pre-event price momentum is introduced in the model, (ii) in Table 7 , the insignificant coefficient for the indicator variable VL (signifying that the Value Line stocks do not outperform their control firms) while the price momentum MOM remains highly significant; and (iii)
in Table 8 , the fact that the excess returns for the Value Line stocks disappear once the momentum effect is controlled for, constitute the most persuasive evidence that price momentum is the primary explanation for the Value Line puzzle.
III.4 An examination of the pre-event price momentum
Our results have so far established that the pre-event price momentum plays a significant role in the Value Line timeliness rank upgrade policy. Next, we dig deeper to identify the possible determinants of this important factor.
Institutional ownership represents smart money. We examine institutional ownership as the percentage holding of the firm's total number of shares outstanding.
We estimate the change in institutional ownership (IO) from (i) the calendar quarter end preceding the six-calendar-month date before the earnings announcement date to (ii) the calendar quarter just preceding the earnings announcement date, approximately the same window over which we measure pre-event price momentum. The institutional holding data is obtained from the 13f Institutional Ownership database from Thomson Financial.
The relative IO change variable is denoted as IOchgB4 and is computed as the later percentage holding minus the previous value.
In Table 9 , Panel A regression models, the dependent variable is the pre-event price momentum MOM. In model 1, we find that the Value Line indicator variable is highly significant (t = 11.76). Clearly, MOM is much higher for our sample Value Line stocks relative to the matched control firms. We next introduce in model 2, the change in institutional ownership before the event (IOchgB4); it too is highly significant (t = 13.29). It is not possible for us to determine whether the institutional buy-side pressure is responsible for the pre-event stock price run-up; or if the institutions notice the price runup and purchase the stock. Regardless, we find that there is a strong positive association between the pre-event price run-up and the change in institutional ownership IOchgB4 over that period.
In Table 9 , Panel B, we perform our robustness checks by examining the results in Panel A with match-adjusted variables. The match-adjusted IOchgB4 remains highly significant. Institutional investors increase their holdings of the sample firms even before the Value Line upgrades are announced. We conclude that the change in institutional ownership is a significant factor associated with MOM, the pre-event price momentum variable.
IV. Conclusions:
Value Line's timeliness rank upgrades, of the stocks that it covers, have been associated with a puzzling drift in the post-event period. The issue has been examined by several financial economists over the past three decades. Prior literature has claimed that the post-event drift is merely a manifestation of the well-documented post-earnings announcement drift. Our results demonstrate that Value Line is not merely piggy-backing on the drift following a publicly disclosed earnings report.
Black (1973) clearly enunciates that price momentum is used by Value Line to rank stocks but prior research has not used it to unravel the Value Line puzzle. Our findings corroborate Black's statement. We find that the pre-event price momentum is a significant key to the Value Line drift puzzle. Our results suggest that Value Line upgrades the timeliness ranks of the stocks it covers following large pre-earnings stock price momentum.
Interestingly, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the price-momentum effects are found for periods of less than 12 months. It may be a coincidence that the Value Line timeliness ranks predict a stock's performance also for a period of similar length. The change in institutional ownership before the event is significantly associated with the preevent price momentum. The institutional owners seem to recognize the possibility of a price momentum, or just as likely their buying efforts cause the pre-event price run-up.
Either Value Line is keeping track of institutional ownership or the price momentum of the stocks that it follows, or both; but it does not necessarily wait for a positive earnings surprise to upgrade the timeliness of the stocks it covers. Regardless, the pre-event price momentum is an important explanatory variable for the post-upgrade drift of the Value Line stocks.
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In conclusion we reiterate that, to its credit, Value Line recognized the momentum trading rule and has been exploiting the price momentum effect for decades. Panel A of this table reports the results of analyzing post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) on the level of earnings surprise (ESURP), and log value of market capitalization (lnMVE). PEAD is measured as size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from trading day 2 through day 120 relative to the earnings announcement date. Level of earnings surprise (ESURP) is obtained at the earnings announcement and measured as the difference between actual earnings and median consensus analyst forecasts, scaled by stock price from I/B/E/S. lnMVE is the natural log of market value of equity in millions as of the statistical period date from I/B/E/S immediately preceding the earnings announcement date. The observations include 1358 Value Line upgraded firms. Panel B of this table reports the results of regressing post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) on the level of earnings surprise (ESURP), preearnings-announcement price momentum (MOM), log value of market capitalization (lnMVE), and the indicator variable VL, with VL =1 for Value Line firms and zero for matched firms. PEAD is measured as size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from trading day 2 through day 120 relative to the announcement date. ESURP is obtained at the earnings announcement and measured as the difference between actual earnings and median consensus analyst forecasts, scaled by stock price. MOM is measured as size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from trading day -126 to day -2 relative to the announcement date. lnMVE, is the natural log of market value of equity in millions as of the statistical period date from I/B/E/S, immediately preceding the earnings announcement date. The observations in each regression include 1358 Value Line upgraded firms and the 1358 best matched control firms. Panel C of this table reports the results of regressing match-adjusted post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD_MA) on the level of match-adjusted earnings surprises (ESURP_MA), match-adjusted pre-earnings-announcement price momentum (MOM_MA), and match-adjusted log value of market capitalization (lnMVE_MA). PEAD_MA is measured as buy-and-hold returns of Value Line upgraded firms minus buy-and-hold returns of the matched firms from trading day 2 through day 120 relative to the earnings announcement date. ESURP_MA is obtained at the earnings announcement and measured as the difference between actual earnings and median consensus analyst forecasts, scaled by stock price of Value Line upgraded firms minus that of the matched firms. MOM_MA is measured as buy-and-hold returns of Value Line upgraded firms minus that of the matched firms from trading day -126 to day -2 relative to the earnings announcement date. lnMVE_MA is log value of market capitalization in millions of Value Line upgraded firms minus that of the matched firm, where each market value is as of the statistical period date from I/B/E/S immediately preceding the earnings announcement date. The observations in each regression include 1358 Value Line upgraded firms. where r p is the portfolio return from the sample firms, r f is the risk-free rate, r m is the market portfolio return, SMB is the small-firm portfolio return minus the big-firm portfolio return, HML is the high book-to-market portfolio return minus the low book-to-market portfolio return for the three factor model. For the four-factor model, to the three-factors discussed above, we add PRIOR which is the winner portfolio return minus the loser portfolio return based on the past 12-month return. The regression estimate of the intercept term represents the abnormal return for the portfolio after controlling for the Fama-French and momentum factors. The Fama-French SMB and HML factors and the momentum factor, PRIOR, are obtained for similar periods from Kenneth French's website. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A of this table reports the results of regressing pre-earnings-announcement price momentum (MOM) on the change in pre-event institutional holdings (IOchgB4), and the indicator variable VL, with VL =1 for Value Line firms and zero for matched firms. MOM is measured as sizeadjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns from trading day -126 to day -2 relative to the earnings announcement date. IOchgB4 is estimated as the difference between 13f institutions' percentage stock ownership in (i) the calendar quarter before the earnings announcement date and in (ii) the calendar quarter six months prior to the earnings announcement. The observations in each regression include Value Line upgraded firms and the best matched control firms with information available in pre-earnings-announcement price momentum and institutional holdings. 
Panel A. Event-months (+1, +6) relative to the earnings announcement date (EAD) for the sample of Value Line upgraded stocks
Figure 2: Event study results
In the figure below, event study results are shown for the sample of Value Line upgraded firms and for the sample of firms matched by earnings surprise. EAD represents the earnings announcement date, while VLD denotes the date on which market participants learned of the upgrade from Value Line. We give each control firm a pseudo upgrade date. Pseudo upgrade date is defined for the control firm such that the number of trading days between the best matched firm's earnings announcement and its pseudo Value Line upgrade date is the same as the number of trading days between Value Line upgraded firm's earnings announcement and its Value Line upgrade date. In the event study, size adjusted abnormal returns were computed for both samples. An estimation period of 255 days ending on day EAD-127 was used to assess the proportion of positive to negative returns used in computing non-parametric sign tests.
1, 2 :
For each window, the top number represents the mean size adjusted abnormal return, while the bottom row provides the number of positive to negative size adjusted returns. 3 :
For the matched pair test results, the top number is the mean matched pair difference in event window size adjusted returns, and the letter in subscripts (if any) denotes the level of significance in a two tailed test of a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test statistic. The bottom row provides a t-statistic and the letter (if any) next to the t-value indicates the level of significance in a two tailed test. a, d :
Significant at the .0001 and .1 levels, respectively
